Rowe’s example will work only if it is necessary that some horsewill finish the race, for otherwise it is possible that all the horsesbreak a leg and none finishes the race—a condition he notes inthat “it is necessary that there exists at least one member ofthe collection”. So why should we think that it is necessarythat something exist, even if it is contingent? Rowe does not say why,but one argument given in defense of this thesis is that the existenceof one contingent being may be necessary for the nonexistence of someother contingent being. But although the fact that something’sexistence is necessary for the non-existence of something else holdsfor certain relational properties (for example, the existence of aspouse is necessary for a man not to be a bachelor), it is doubtfulthat something’s existence is necessary for the non-existence ofsomething else per se, which is what is needed to support theargument that denies the contingency of the universe.


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